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The Other Nuclear Option: Adopting a
Constitutional Amendment to Furnish a
Lasting Solution to the Troubled Judicial
Confirmation Process
Ryan T. Becker*
He stood in the well of the United States Senate, weary from talking
for nearly twenty-four hours, weak in the knees from thundering against
corruption, refusing to give up the floor until he convinced his colleagues
of the righteousness of his cause.1 In doing so, Jimmy Stewart, playing
the role of Senator Jefferson Smith in Frank Capra's American classic,
Mr. Smith Goes to Washington, staged one of the most famous filibusters
in American history, albeit a fictional one. Until recently, this film may
have represented most Americans' familiarity with the Senate procedure
known as the filibuster. However, the public is becoming aware of this
procedural tactic once again, although in a scenario with far greater
implications than the fictional one in which Jefferson Smith was the
main character. The filibuster has recently become the centerpiece of the
battle between Republicans and Democrats over the confirmation of
judicial nominees.
When describing the power of the Judicial Branch of the United
States Government, Alexander Hamilton said, "[I]ncontestably ... the
judiciary is beyond comparison the weakest of the three departments of
power.... 2 Given all of the partisan rancor in recent years among
* J.D. Candidate, The Dickinson School of Law of The Pennsylvania State
University, 2007. The author wishes to thank his family, especially his parents, as well
as Jennifer Graybill, for all of their unwavering support and motivation. Special thanks
to Caitlin Becker and Steve Kovatis for their outstanding help in the editing process, and
Professor Thomas Odom for helping with selecting this topic.
1. MR. SMITH GOES TO WASHINGTON (Columbia Pictures 1939).
2. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 433 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
3. See American Bar Association 2005 Legislative Priorities, Independence of the
Judiciary: Judicial Vacancies and the Nomination and Confirmation Process,
http://www.abanet.org/poladv/priorities/j udicialvacancies.html#status (last visited
January 21, 2007) (noting that the judicial confirmation process has become more
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lawmakers over judicial nominees, and the increasing use of procedural
tactics to delay or prevent votes on nominees, both parties seem to
recognize that the judicial power has grown substantially since
Hamilton's time.
The battle between Republicans and Democrats over the President's
nominees to fill federal court vacancies reached the tipping point in May
2005.4  Senate Democrats had previously blocked a vote on ten of
President Bush's nominees to the federal bench.5  Senate Majority
Leader Bill Frist was willing to use what has been dubbed the "nuclear
option," or the "constitutional option" to force an up or down vote on the
nominees. 6  Invoking the "nuclear option" would entail changing the
Senate Rules to allow a majority of Senators, fifty-one, to end debate on
a judicial nomination and proceed to a vote rather than the sixty Senators
that are currently required.7 On the night before the vote was scheduled
to ban the judicial filibuster, a group of Senators from both parties, now
known as the "Gang of 14," reached a compromise agreement whereby
the Democrats stopped the filibuster on three of the President's contested
U.S. Appeals Court nominees, allowed those nominees a confirmation
vote, and signed a memo that preserves the filibuster for judicial
nominees in extraordinary circumstances. 8
contentious in recent years with each party blaming the other for politicizing the process)
[hereinafter ABA Legislative Priorities]. Senators on both sides of the aisle have also
gone so far as to describe the other side's tactics by making a reference to Hitler and the
Nazi regime. Senator Robert Byrd, a Democrat from West Virginia, when discussing his
opposition to President Bush's nominees said, "Many times in our history we have taken
up arms to protect a minority against the tyrannical majority in other lands. We, unlike
Nazi Germany or Moussolini's Italy, have never stopped being a nation of laws, not of
men." Mark Leibovich, The Comparison that Ends the Conversation, WASH. POST, June
22, 2005, at CO 1. Former Senator Rick Santorum, a Pennsylvania Republican, responded
to the claim that his party was violating the rules when they opposed the Democrats'
filibuster of the President's nominees by saying, "The audacity of some members to stand
up and say, 'How dare you break this rule?'-it's the equivalent of Adolf Hitler in 1942
saying, 'I'm in Paris. How dare you invade me? How dare you bomb my city? It's
mine."' Id.
4. See Carl Hulse, Dispute in the Senate: The Overview; Fight on Judges and
Filibusters Opens in Senate, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 2005, at Al (describing the looming
showdown in the Senate as a "defining moment" and comparing the atmosphere to the
impeachment trial of President Clinton six years earlier).
5. Charles Babington & Shailagh Murray, A Last Minute Deal on Judicial
Nominees; Senators Agree On Votes for 3; 2 Could Still Face Filibusters, WASH. POST,
May 24, 2005 at AOl.
6. The NewsHour with Jim Lehrer: Interview with Senator Bill Frist (PBS
television broadcast Mar. 1, 2005).
7. Id. For a more detailed account of the parliamentary maneuverings that will
likely be used to change the Senate rules and end the judicial filibuster, see Mike Allen &
Jeffrey H. Birnbaum, A Likely Script for the "Nuclear Option, " WASH. POST, May 18,
2005 at AOl.
8. Babington & Murray, supra note 5.
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While this last-minute deal may have averted a short term crisis, any
party that holds the majority in the Senate can still invoke the "nuclear
option" in the future. Further, while this was the most recent partisan
battle over the judicial nomination process, it was not the first.
Republicans are just as guilty as Democrats of using procedural tactics to
delay the confirmation of previous Presidential judicial nominees. 9 Since
elections can shift the balance of power in the Senate between
Republicans and Democrats in any given year,10 the most effective way
to deal with the increasing partisan fights over judicial nominations is to
develop a long term, bipartisan solution to the problem.
This Comment will address the problems with the judicial
confirmation process as it is currently structured and argue that the best
way to create a lasting solution in the best interests of both parties is to
adopt a constitutional amendment addressing the entire nomination
process. Part I will detail the background of the battle over judicial
nominees and examine the delay tactics used by both parties which led
Senator Frist to the brink of invoking the "nuclear option." Part II will
discuss the effects of continued partisan rancor in the process and explain
why short term solutions to the problem are inadequate, not in the best
interests of the American people, and not consistent with the traditions of
the United States Senate. Part III will examine the potential topics that
can be covered in a constitutional amendment. The Comment concludes
by proposing some draft language of an amendment that could be used as
a starting point in the discussions.
The adoption of a constitutional amendment that addresses all
phases of the judicial nomination process is the best way to avoid the
ongoing partisan battles that destabilize the judiciary and prevent the
effective administration of our judicial system. With a constitutional
amendment in place, we will have a system fair to minority and majority.
We will have a system that cannot be changed by partisan whim. We
will have a system that might even capture the idealistic vision of
Jefferson Smith.
9. See 151 CONG. REC. S4807 (May 10, 2005) (Statement of Senator Dianne
Feinstein, a Democrat from California) (describing the procedural tactics used by
Republicans to deny confirmation votes for judicial nominees).
10. This idea became crystal clear this past November, when in the midterm
elections, the Democrats netted the six seats they needed to take control of the U.S.
Senate. See Michael D. Shear & Alec MacGillis, Democrats Take Control of Senate As
Allen Concedes to Webb in Va., WASH. POST, Nov. 10, 2006 at A01. Jim Webb unseated
Senator George Allen in a hotly contested race that was no conceded by Senator Allen
until 2 days after Election Day, which gave the Democrats a 1 seat majority. Id.
Virginia's Governor Timothy Kaine announced the victory to the crowd by saying, "It is
Virginia that turned the Senate blue." Id.
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I. The Road to the Brink of the "Nuclear Option"
The Constitution gives the President the power to appoint judges
with the "Advice and Consent" of the U.S. Senate.' l The precise
definition of the Senate's role and the nature of its power to advise and
consent are at the heart of the current problem.
The judicial filibuster, while not the only procedural tactic
employed by senators to delay or deny a vote on a judicial nominee, is
the device that is gamering the most attention right now. A filibuster
occurs when there is a "member in the minority who resorts to
obstructive tactics to prevent the adoption of a measure or procedure that
is favored by the majority." 12 The filibuster is made possible by Senate
Rule XXII, which allows for cloture to be invoked,13 subsequently
ending debate, if three-fifths of the Senators-60 given the current 100
Senate membership---vote in favor of the motion.
14
While many Republicans have been quick to label the Democrats'
attempt to filibuster President Bush's nominees in 2005 as
unprecedented, 15 Republicans actually led the first full scale filibuster of
a judicial nominee. 16 In 1968, Abe Fortas was nominated by President
Lyndon B. Johnson to serve as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.'
7
Senate Republicans led a filibuster that prevented President Johnson's
nomination from being put to a vote by the full Senate. 18 When the
Senate failed to invoke cloture and vote on the nomination, President
Johnson withdrew the appointment. 19
For purposes of this Comment, a starting point for the recent
partisan battles over the judicial confirmation process is President
Reagan's 1987 nomination of Robert Bork to be an Associate Justice of
11. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
12. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 661 (8th ed. 2004).
13. Cloture is "the procedure of ending debate in a legislative body and calling for
an immediate vote." Id.
14. Standing Rules of the Senate, Rule XXII, http://rules.senate.gov/senaterules/
rule22.php (last visited January 21, 2007).
15. See Charles Babington, Filibuster Precedent? Democrats Point to '68 and
Fortas, WASH. POST, March 18, 2005 at A03 (quoting Senator Arlen Specter, a
Republican from Pennsylvania who is the Chairman of the Judiciary Committee, as
noting that the filibuster has been used with judicial nominations "for the first time in the
history of the Republic"). The article also refers to a speech that Orrin Hatch, a
Republican from Utah and Former Chairman of the Judiciary Committee, made on the





19. Tanya N. Ballard, Supreme Court Nominees Who Were Never Confirmed, WASH.
POST, October 27, 2005, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/
10/27/AR2005102701005 pf.html.
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the Supreme Court. The nomination was a polarizing event for both the
country and the United States Senate. 20  There was a wide-scale
mobilization of interest groups across the country that united to turn the
tide of public opinion against the nomination, including organized
demonstrations in major cities and television ads that warned the public
about the consequences of the Senate approving President Reagan's
nomination of Judge Bork to the Court.21  The nomination was
eventually defeated 58-42.22 As a result of this failed nomination, the
verb "to bork" is now a part of our nation's lexicon when discussing
judicial nominations.23
During the majority of President Clinton's time in office, the Senate
was controlled by Republicans. 4 While the filibuster was not the
primary delay tactic used by the Republicans in those days, they stalled
judicial nominations by virtue of their control over the Senate Judiciary
Committee.25 When the President selects a candidate for the federal
bench, the nomination is assigned to the Senate Judiciary Committee,
which holds hearings and then votes whether to report the nomination to
20. See Manuel Miranda, The Original Barking, WALL ST. J., Aug. 24, 2005
(Editorial Page), available at http://www.opinionjoumal.com/nextjustice/?id=l 10007149.
Mr. Miranda detailed the stiff opposition that Judge Bork's nomination faced almost
immediately after President Reagan made the appointment. Minutes after the
announcement, Senator Kennedy made a speech on the Senate floor in which he
characterized Bork's vision of America as "a land in which women would be forced into
back alley abortions, blacks would sit in segregated lunch counters, rogue police could
break down citizens' doors in midnight raids .. " Id.
21. See id.
22. Id.
23. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY offers a definition: "1. (Of the U.S. Senate) to reject
a nominee, esp. for the Supreme Court, on grounds of the nominee's unorthodox political
and legal philosophy... . 2. (Of political and legal activists) to embark on a media
campaign to pressure U.S. Senators into rejecting a President's nominee." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 196 (8th ed. 2004).
24. The Republicans won control of the Senate in 1994, after picking up eight seats
previously held by Democrats. See Richard L. Berke, The 1994 Elections: The
Overview; G.O.P Wins Control of Senate and Makes Big Gains in House; Pataki Denies
Cuomo 4'h Term, N.Y. TIMES, November 9, 1994, at Al. Republicans held control of the
Senate for the duration of Clinton's presidency. Democrats took control of the Senate
again when Senator Jim Jeffords left the Republican Party to become an Independent in
2001 and announced he would caucus with the Democrats, giving that party a one seat
advantage. See Lizette Alvarez, Senate's Democrats Aim to Walk Softly but Carry a Big
Gavel, N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 2001, at A l. Republicans regained the control of the Senate
in the 2002 election. See Todd S. Purdum & Alison Mitchell, The 2002 Elections: The
Senate Republicans Regain Control of Senate, With Victory in Missouri, N.Y. TIMES,
November 6, 2002, at B2. The balance of power in the Senate switched hands once again
in November 2006, the most recent general election, when the Democrats netted 6 seats,
and took a one seat majority in the chamber. See Shear & MacGillis, supra note 10.
25. See Herman Schwartz, Senate Rules Meltdown, CBS NEWS, Mar. 27, 2005,
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2005/03/25/opinion/printable683182.shtml.
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the full Senate.16 The Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee is
considered the "steward" of the nominee, a post which, until recently,
was held by the moderate Republican Senator from Pennsylvania, Arlen
Specter.27 After the Senate returned to Democratic control this past
January, Senator Patrick Leahy regained the chair position.28
When the Republicans controlled the Senate Judiciary Committee
during the Clinton years, one method of delaying judicial appointments
employed by that party was the use of a "blue slip."'29 Senator Dianne
Feinstein, a Democrat from California who is a member of the Senate
Judiciary Committee, described the practice of the blue slip as it was
used during the later years of the Clinton Administration in a speech on
the Senate floor in November of 2003. 30 "[I]f there was an objection
from a home State Senator, that nominee simply did not move, did not
get a hearing, did not get a vote, did not get confirmed. It was, in fact, a
filibuster of one., 31 Senator Feinstein supported her claim by providing
examples of President Clinton's nominees who were effectively blocked
from receiving a confirmation vote by one or two members of the
Senate.32
In a statement during a 2003 hearing by a subcommittee of the
Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Democratic Senator Patrick Leahy,
currently the Committee Chairman, explained some of the procedural
tactics used by Republicans during their time in control of the Senate
from 1995-2001. 33 Senator Leahy explained that the reason for the
problem with the judicial nomination process is the failure of the
26. See Senator Orrin G. Hatch, At Last a Look at the Facts: The Truth About the
Judicial Selection Process: Each is Entitled to His Own Opinion, But Not To His Own
Facts, 11 GEO. MASON L. REV. 467 (2003) [hereinafter Hatch]. In this article, Senator
Hatch outlines the Senate Judiciary Committee's role in the modem judicial confirmation
process and defends his own record of moving nominees through the nomination process
during his tenure as the Chairman of the Judiciary Committee from 1995-2001.
27. See Jeffrey Toobin, Blowing up the Senate, THE NEW YORKER, March 7, 2005, at
42.
28. United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary, http://judiciary.senate.gov/
members.cfm (last visited Jan. 22, 2007).
29. According to the United States Department of Justice Office of Legal Policy, "A
blue slip is the traditional method of allowing the home state senators of a judicial
nominee to express their approval or disapproval. Blue slips are generally given
substantial weight by the Judiciary Committee in its consideration of a judicial nominee."
U.S. Department of Justice Office of Legal Policy, http://www.usdoj.gov/olp/
judicialnominations.htm (last visited October 30, 2005).
30. See 149 CONG. REC. S14531-01, S14537-38.
31. Id. at S14537.
32. Id.
33. Judicial Nominations, Filibusters, and the Constitution: When a Majority is
Denied its Right to Consent: Hearing Before the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Property
Rights Subcomm. Of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. (2003) (statement of
Sen. Patrick Leahy, Ranking Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary).
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Republicans to take steps to work with the Democrats to find a workable
solution.34  According to Senator Leahy, the preferred tactic of
Republicans during the Clinton years was to block nominations in secret
by placing the nominations on an anonymous hold, allowing the Senator
to escape accountability for causing the delay. 35  "Republicans held up
almost 80 judicial nominees who were not acted upon during the
Congress in which President Clinton first nominated them and eventually
defeated more than 50 judicial nominees without a recorded Senate vote
of any kind, just by refusing to proceed with hearings and Committee
votes," according to the Senator.36
The flare-up of tensions between the parties regarding judicial
nominees that began during the most recent Bush administration
surrounds a handful of appointments that President Bush has to fill
vacant spots on the United States Court of Appeals.37 The idea of a
parliamentary procedure to end the Democrats' filibuster of nominees
apparently originated in the Senate cloakroom (a room just off the Senate
Chamber) while the Democrats were trying to block the nomination of
Miguel Estrada.38 The President had nominated Estrada to hold a seat on
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.39 While
the Republicans were tired of the delay tactics 40 employed by the




37. See Toobin, supra note 27, at 42. "The precipitating factor [in invoking the
nuclear option] is a continuing controversy over President Bush's judicial selections.
Although more than two hundred of Bush's nominees were approved by the Senate in the
past four years, Democrats used the filibuster to stop ten appellate court choices." Id.
38. Id. at 43.
39. Id. Toobin describes a remark by Ted Stevens, a Republican from Alaska,
complaining about the Democrats' tactics, as the starting point for the concerted effort on
the part of Republicans to put together a proposal that would effectively end judicial
filibusters through a change in internal Senate operating procedures.
40. Senator Hatch expressed his exasperation with the current judicial nominating
process and the tactics used to delay confirmation votes to qualified judges. "[A]s liberal
Senate Democrats work in tandem with some in the media to delay nominations, and
score political points with special interest groups .... We have entered a new and
uncharted territory of Democratic-led obstructionism that threatens the administration of
justice in our nation." See Hatch, supra note 26, at 491-92.
41. Russ Feingold, a Democrat from Wisconsin, and at the time the ranking member
of the Senate Subcommittee on the Constitution which held hearings in 2003 on the
filibuster of judicial nominations, took the floor of the United States Senate in May 2005
to deliver a speech decrying the Republicans' proposal to end the judicial filibuster. 151
CONG. REc. S5287 (May 17, 2005). Senator Feingold defended the use of the filibuster,
even though he spent seven years championing a campaign finance bill that had the
support of a bipartisan majority but was repeatedly delayed because of filibusters. Id. at
S5290. Senator Feingold emphasized that the Senate was conceived by the Framers as a
check on the power of the majority, and to allow the nuclear option would "irretrievably
2007]
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parliamentary maneuver to end a procedural tactic that has been used to
protect the rights of the minority in the Senate for more than 150 years.42
This escalation of partisan tensions led then-Senate Majority Leader Frist
to the brink of invoking the "nuclear option" in 2005, which would
effectively put an end to the judicial filibuster.43
On May 18, 2005, Senator Frist took the floor of the Senate to
debate the nomination of Priscilla Owen, but it quickly became clear that
the discussion would center on the acceptability of the filibuster and the
future of the nomination process. 4 Frist drew the battle lines early, first
stating that the "new precedent [of using the filibuster] cannot stand in
Congress" and then demanding that the filibuster be stopped by allowing
nominees a vote or by changing rules to end the judicial filibuster.45
Senator Specter freely acknowledged that both parties were to blame for
the current impasse, and that many Democrats viewed the filibuster as a
way to return the favor to Republicans who used delay tactics on
President Clinton's nominees.46 Senator Harry Reid responded to
Senator Frist by couching the Democrats' actions in terms of protecting
the rights of the minority: "If Republicans roll back our rights in this
chamber, there will be no check on their power. The radical, right wing
will be free to pursue any agenda they want.,
47
Just when it looked like the only option for the Republicans was to
"go nuclear," at the eleventh hour, a compromise was reached among
fourteen Senators - seven Democrats 48 and seven Republicans 49 - that
avoided the rule change.50  The group signed a memorandum of
understanding 51 that allowed a vote on three of the contested nominees.
52
change the very character of the Senate, and irretrievably weaken the institution." Id. at
S5291. Senator Feingold felt that the Senate was "about to be thrown into a
constitutional crisis by a majority that is drunk with power." Id. at S5292.
42. According to the U.S. Senate's website describing the origin and development of
various powers and procedures, the filibuster (which is derived from a Dutch word for
pirate) has been popular with Senators since the 1850s. U.S. Senate: Filibuster and
Cloture, http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/briefing/Filibuster-
Cloture.htm (last visited Jan. 22, 2007).





48. Ben Nelson, Robert Byrd, Joseph Lieberman, Mark Pryor, Mary Landrieu, Ken
Salazar, and Daniel Inouye. See Babington & Murray, supra note 5.
49. John McCain, John Warner, Susan Collins, Olympia Snowe, Lincoln Chafee,
Mike DeWine, and Lindsey Graham. Id.
50. Id.
51. The full text of the two page memo is available at http://images.dailykos.com/
images/user/3/TheDeal.pdf (last visited Jan. 22, 2007).
52. Id.
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The "Gang of 14" also agreed that future judicial nominees will only be
filibustered in "extraordinary circumstances," and, according to the
commitments made in the agreement, the entire group would oppose the
nuclear option.5 3 Finally, the memo encouraged the President to consult
Senators from both parties before making future nominations.54 Senator
John McCain, speaking after the agreement was announced, recognized
the gravity of the situation and the importance of this bipartisan
compromise when he said, "We have reached an agreement to try to
avert a crisis in the United States Senate and pull the institution back
from a precipice that would have had-in the view of all 14 of us-
lasting impact on the institution."55
While this deal avoided a showdown on the Senate floor, and
represented a bipartisan step in the right direction to address the
increasing partisan rancor plaguing the process, the agreement was not a
long term solution. After the announcement of the agreement, Senator
Mike DeWine, one of the signatories of the deal, announced that he
would support a ban on the judicial filibuster via the nuclear option if he
felt that the Democrats were not fulfilling their end of the bargain.56 The
nuclear option is not dead; it has merely been postponed. The
parliamentary maneuvering that would lead to the nuclear option being
invoked is still a very real tactic that the majority party has at its disposal
to deal with delay tactics employed by the Senate's minority party.
II. A Long Term Solution, Rather than the "Nuclear Option," is
Needed to Solve the Problem of Judicial Nomination Gridlock
Article III of the Constitution of the United States established the
federal judiciary and makes it a coequal branch of government.
57
However, since federal judges are appointed 58 and not elected, the people
do not have a direct vote in the selection of judges as they do when they
vote for President or members of Congress. Nonetheless, the selection
and appointment of judges is perennially a campaign issue, especially in
Presidential elections, since the President is charged with making
appointments to the Supreme Court.59
53. Id.
54. See id.
55. Senators Compromise on Filibusters, CNN.COM, May 24, 2005,
http://www.cnn.com/2005/POLITICS/05/24/filibuster.fight/.
56. See id.
57. See U.S. CONST. art. III.
58. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
59. This was especially true during the last Presidential election, when the sentiment
was that the next President would have the opportunity to appoint at least one Justice of
the Supreme Court. See Neil A. Lewis, The Bush Record: Sixth Article in a series: The
Judiciary. The 2004 Campaign: The Policies; Mixed Results for Bush in Battle over
2007]
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While Supreme Court nominations are the most highly publicized
battles over judicial philosophies, any proposed solution to the judicial
nomination gridlock must address the appointment of all judicial
nominees. Most of the judge-made federal law in the United States is
made not at the Supreme Court level, but rather in the United States
Court of Appeals. 60 Given the large caseloads of federal judges serving
at the appellate level, the effectiveness of the federal judiciary at that
level is crucial to the efficient functioning of the judiciary in the United
States as a whole. It is therefore critical to ensure that there is a fair and
effective judicial confirmation process to allow our courts to operate with
a full complement of qualified judges who are ready, willing, and able to
serve the American people.
The increased use of delay tactics and partisan rancor in the
confirmation process has had a negative effect on the administration of
justice and, if left unchecked, will likely continue to worsen in the future.
A judicial candidate nominated for a seat on the federal bench is now
likely to wait an average of six months before confirmation, as compared
to a wait of only about one month during President Reagan's first term in
office. 61 A number of the Courts of Appeals have had to work with
significantly less than a full complement of judges in recent years, with
the Sixth Circuit facing a serious shortage of members.62 The American
Bar Association has made the problem of judicial vacancies and the
increased partisanship in the nomination process a legislative priority for
Judges, N.Y. TIMES, October 22, 2004, at Al. That sentiment was correct, as President
Bush has made two appointments to the Supreme Court during 2005, to fill the seats of
the late Chief Justice William Rehnquist, and the retiring Justice Sandra Day O'Connor.
The battle for the Courts will likely play a large role in the upcoming 2008 Presidential
race as well.
60. According to the Federal Court Managements statistics maintained by the
Administrative Office of the United States Courts, for the twelve-month period ending
September 12, 2005, there were over 66,000 appeals filed in the US Court of Appeals,
and over 67,000 appeals terminated during that time span. The statistics are available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/fcmstat/index.html (last visited Jan. 29, 2007). By comparison,
the Supreme Court of the United States during its October 2004 Term only heard
arguments in ninety-one cases and issued full opinions in only eighty-seven cases. See
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE
UNITED STATES COURTS, SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES-CASE tN DOCKET,
DISPOSED OF, AND REMAINING ON DOCKET AT CONCLUSION OF OCTOBER TERMS, 2000
THROUGH 2004 (2005), http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2004/appendices/al.pdf.
61. RICHARD DAVIS, ELECTING JUSTICE 12 (2005).
62. See Carl Tobias, The Federal Appellate Court Appointments Conundrum, 2005
UTAH L. REV. 743 (2005). Professor Tobias notes that 10% of circuit court judgeships
are usually empty. Id. Further, "The United States Courts of Appeals for the Second,
Fourth, and Ninth Circuits operated without a third of their judicial complements at
different junctures throughout this period [since 1990], while the United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit functioned absent half its members over eight recent
months." Id.
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its organization, noting, "Extensive vacancies or protracted delays in the
judicial nomination and confirmation process weaken the federal
judiciary by depriving it of the judges needed to resolve disputes
expeditiously.,
63
While increased partisan rancor and delay tactics are issues that
need to be resolved, resorting to the "nuclear option," essentially
changing the rules of the Senate in the middle of the game, is not the
most effective way to deal with the problem. A bipartisan solution that
will work not just in the Senate as it is now constituted 64 but well into the
future is the best way to address a problem that ultimately affects all
Americans.
The last two presidential elections have shown that Americans are
fairly evenly divided when taking to the polls to elect their leaders. In
the 2000 election, President George W. Bush defeated Al Gore after a
prolonged recount in Florida, where Bush prevailed by a little more than
500 votes.65 President Bush netted 271 electoral votes, just four more
than Gore, and ascended to the presidency despite losing the popular
vote.66 This razor close contest also made popular the notion of an
America divided into red and blue states, "red states" representing states
that voted for President Bush, the Republican candidate, and "blue
states" representing those that voted for Vice President Gore, the
Democratic candidate.67 In 2004, the election was once again decided by
a single state: Ohio.68
This partisan divide carries over to Congress as well. Democrats
regained control of both houses of Congress after the 2006 election,69 but
those majorities are slim and subject to change in any given year by the
will of a closely divided electorate. This close division of the American
electorate is one of the reasons that "going nuclear" may eventually harm
the party who decides to take this drastic measure. While the party may
enjoy a short term victory, there may well be political repercussions.
According to a Washington Post/ABC News poll taken in late April
63. See ABA Legislative Priorities, supra note 3.
64. The current Senate consists of 49 Democrats, 49 Republicans, and 2
Independents. See MSNBC.com, Democrats Win Control of Senate,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/I 5620405/ (last visited Jan. 29, 2007).
65. CBSNews.com,http://www.cbsnews.com/campaign2000results/state/state_fl.
html (last visited Jan. 29, 2007).
66. Full, official election results are made available through the Federal Election
Commission at www.fec.gov/pubrec/2000presgeresults.htm (last visited Jan. 29, 2007).
67. See Liz Marlantes, Inside red-and-blue America, THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE
MONITOR, July 14, 2004, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/2004/0714/p01s03-
usgn.htm.
68. See Adam Nagourney, The 2004 Elections: The Presidency-The Overview;
Bush Celebrates Victory, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2004, at Al.
69. See John M. Broder, Democrats Take Senate, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2006, at Al.
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2005, at the height of the concern that Senator Frist was going to use the
"nuclear option," Americans were firm in their opposition to such a rule
change. 70 A change in the confirmation procedure could well be subject
to very vocal public opposition, and Senators voting to implement the
plan could end up feeling the effects of that opposition the next time their
names appear on the ballot.
Further, given the increasing partisan divide in Washington and
ideological segregation of the electorate, 71 a move to invoke the nuclear
option despite public opposition could drive a deeper wedge between the
two parties that could stall any progress on other substantive legislative
matters and make doing business in the Senate a more difficult chore
than it already is. According to George Will, a reporter and political
analyst for ABC News, Democrats would have responded to the nuclear
option, had it been invoked, by using the Rules of the Senate to delay
efficient operation of the body.72 Senate rules do give the minority
ample opportunity to obstruct the smooth workings of the institution, and
Democrats have previously threatened to use those rules to their
advantage if they deem it necessary; and presumably, so could a
Republican minority. 73 Even Senator Specter recognized that the nuclear
option could become a serious impediment to conducting the business of
the chamber. "I'm going to exercise every last ounce of my energy to
solve the problem without the nuclear option. If we have a nuclear
option, the Senate will be in turmoil and the Judiciary Committee will be
70. Richard Morin & Dan Balz, Filibuster Rule Change Opposed, WASH. POST,
April 26, 2005, at A01 (citing the poll's findings that "even many Republicans were
reluctant to abandon current Senate confirmation procedures: Nearly half opposed any
rule changes, joining eight in ten Democrats and seven in ten political independents).
71. See Marlantes, supra note 67. The article describes voters who are increasingly
identifying themselves with a particular political party, tend to be willing to follow party
leaders who appear more driven by ideology, and even mention that they find it difficult
to discuss political issues with those who have a different point of view. Alan
Abramowitz, a political science professor from Emory University, notes, "As the
electorate becomes more polarized, [so do the leaders], and each part of that reinforces
the other." Id.
72. George Will, Commentary: Ending Judicial Filibuster Could Haunt the GOP,
VICTORVILLE DAILY PRESS, Mar. 18, 2005, available at http://www.vvdailypress.com/
2005/111115496996222.html.
73. See Toobin, note 27, at 46. Former Senate Democratic Leader Tom Daschle,
who lost his bid for reelection in 2004, told the author, "The Senate runs on unanimous
consent.... The vast majority of the work of the Senate is done in that way. But any
individual Senator can insist that every bill be read, every vote be taken, and bring the
whole place to a stop." Id. It should be noted that one of the avenues of attack against
Daschle pursued by Senator John Thune, the man who ousted Daschle from the Senate,
was that Daschle should be defeated because he had become "the obstructionist-in-chief."
Id. As Toobin points out, this may be a signal that any party that wishes to try and
shutdown the business of the Senate could be a move with serious political consequences.
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hell."74
Another related problem is the fact that a few seat changes in an
election can tip the balance of power between parties in the Senate. With
a power shift a very real possibility each election, a majority party
supporting changing the rules to end judicial filibusters could face a
situation in the near future where it is in the minority. As members of
the minority, they would lack the ability to use the filibuster as a way to
block nominees from a future President who may not be from their own
party. George Will posed the following hypothetical for Republican
leaders to contemplate in a recent article he wrote describing the effects
of using the nuclear option, given the certainty that there will be
Democratic Senators and Democratic Presidents in the years to come:
"How would you react were such a [Democratic] majority about to
change Senate rules to prevent you from filibustering to block a nominee
likely to construe the Equal Protection Clause as creating a constitutional
right to same sex marriages?" 75 After the 2006 election put Republicans
in the minority, this hypothetical scenario may well become a reality.
While "going nuclear" may be politically expedient for the party in the
majority, it could spell trouble in the future when there is a shift in the
political winds: that party could well be left out in the cold, without the
use of this procedural delay tactic. Further, supporting the nuclear option
when your party is in the majority and then opposing that rule change
when your party is in the minority will open a Senator up to an attack
that they are a hypocrite.
Procedural maneuverings that deny the minority's ability to
filibuster judicial nominees also set a dangerous precedent. Such a move
can be viewed as a slippery slope: if a majority uses a rule change to
outlaw the judicial filibuster now, what is to stop them, or a future
majority party, from using similar tactics to deny the minority the ability
to use the filibuster for legislative issues? In a letter to the Editor that
appeared in the Wall Street Journal, two former Republican Senators,
Jim McClure and Malcolm Wallop addressed this very issue.76 While
they disagreed with the decision of the Democrats to use the filibuster to
block judicial nominations, they urged the leaders of their party to avoid
74. Charles Babington, Specter Predicts Turmoil May Grow From Impasse, WASH.
POST, February 25, 2005, at A04. Specter also pointed out that both parties are to blame
for the current impasse over judicial nominees, further underscoring the argument that
both parties must work together to forge a bipartisan, lasting solution.
75. Will, supra note 72.
76. Jim McClure & Malcolm Wallop, Don't Go Nuclear, WALL ST. J., Mar. 15,
2005, at A20. The two former Senators also noted that it should not be forgotten that it
was not long ago that there were times when the filibuster was the only tool at the
Republicans' disposal to block "excesses of a bipartisan liberalism." Id.
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the "nuclear option." 77 "[I]t is naive to think that what is done to the
judicial filibuster will not later be done to its legislative counterpart,
whether by a majority leader named Reid, Clinton, or Kennedy.
7 8
Another reason why doing away with the filibuster of judicial
nominations is not an adequate solution to the problem has to do with the
very nature of the Senate as an institution. The Constitution provides
that the Senate is an institution where each state has equal
representation.79 Many of the delegates from smaller states during the
Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia in 1787 were concerned about
a tyranny of the majority: that the larger states would have the ability to
push their own agendas because there were more people living there,
riding roughshod over the rights and interests of the citizens in the less
populous states. 80 The "Great Compromise" was the solution that the
delegates came up with to ease the fears of the smaller states regarding
representation in the new government: proportional representation in the
House and equal representation in the Senate.81 Protection of the
minority, one of the principles upon which the Senate was founded, is a
principle that is also served by the use of the filibuster.
The Senate was also set up to be different from the House of
Representatives in another important way. Senators are elected to serve
for six years, while House members are elected to serve a two year
term.83 The reason for the longer terms is to allow the Senators to be
more insulated from public opinion, less easily swayed by what
Alexander Hamilton called the "amazing violence and turbulence of the
democratic spirit.,8 4 Following that logic, the House is supposed to be
the chamber that is more subject to the passions of the people, and the
Senate is supposed to be the more deliberative body. There is an oft
quoted exchange, even if it may be of dubious veracity, which
supposedly took place between George Washington and Thomas
Jefferson that illustrates the purpose of the Senate, and how it is different
from the House. Thomas Jefferson was in France during the
77. Id.
78. Id. Tom Daschle also made a similar observation detailing his concern that this
rule change may not be limited to judicial nominations only. "Within ten years, there'd
be rules that you can't filibuster tax cuts." Toobin, supra note 27, at 46.
79. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 3.
80. See Senate.gov, U.S. Senate: The Senate and the United States Constitution,
http://www.senate.gov/artandhistroy/history/common/briefing/ConstitutionSenate (last
visited Jan. 22, 2006).
81. See id.
82. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 3.
83. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2.
84. See Senate.gov, U.S. Senate: The Senate and the United States Constitution,
http://www.senate.gov/artandhistroy/history/common/briefing/Constitution-Senate.htm
(last visited January 29, 2007).
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Constitutional Convention and when he returned, he asked George
Washington why the Senate was created. Washington replied with a
question: "Why did you pour that coffee into your saucer?" he asked
Jefferson. "To cool it," the statesman replied. Washington responded by
saying, "We pour legislation into the senatorial saucer to cool it." 85 In
the Senate, the members are able to slow down the legislative process,
and it is a place where the minority has a chance to make sure their views
are heard. The filibuster is one of the tools available to make sure the
rights of the minority are protected against the very tyranny of the
majority that the Framers of the Constitution were so concerned about.
As Senator Joe Biden said, "The chance to filibuster is what makes the
difference between this body and the other one.'
86
Senator Biden has been a vocal opponent of any rule change that
would end in abolishing the filibuster for judicial nominees, largely
focusing on the history and tradition of the Senate as an institution that
has always maintained a protection of the minority voices.87 In an
interview on Hardball, with Chris Matthews, Biden reiterated his
concern that it would be dangerous to get to a point where a simple
majority of Senators can make every single decision, which would be the
case if there were no filibuster.88 Senator Biden compared the Senate
without the use of a filibuster to a parliament, with the President acting
as Prime Minister and the members of his party simply acquiescing to his
will.89 He said that the better way to approach the issue is to recognize
that Senators are not employees of the President, but rather, they are
independent equals.90
The consequences of the decision to invoke the nuclear option now,
or at some point in the future, would be far reaching and could very well
lead to an even farther ratcheting up of bitter partisan maneuvering on
both sides, and a shutdown of cooperation between members on
opposing sides of the aisle in the Senate. Resorting to a rule change that
would obliterate the judicial filibuster is simply not the best way to
handle the problem. Reasonable and respected members of both parties
have urged caution and sought to avoid the use of the "nuclear option."
There is a better solution to be found, and it will take good faith efforts
of both sides in order to find it.
85. See Senate.gov, U.S. Senate: Senate Legislative Process, http://www.senate.gov/
legislative/common/briefing/Senate-legislative-process.htm (last visited January 8,
2006).
86. See Toobin, note 27, at 42.
87. See Interview with Joseph Biden, U.S. Senator, Hardball (MSNBC television
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1II. The Other Constitutional Option
Rather than adopting a rule change that could lead to a virtual
shutdown of all Senate business, including nominations, this Comment
proposes that a bipartisan commission be established in order to study
the feasibility of a constitutional amendment to provide a long term,
comprehensive solution to the problems with the judicial nomination
process. The amendment should consider all of the phases of the
process, and should reflect a blend of the concerns of both parties in
order for the solution to be workable. The latest election has shown how
easy it is for a Republican majority to be turned into a minority, and the
next election could once again shift the balance of power. Therefore,
armed with the reasonable assumption that the future will continue to
bring us Presidents representing both parties, it would ultimately be
beneficial for both sides to find an acceptable long term fix for problems
that have arisen during the judicial nomination process. There are a
number of areas of the process that could be addressed by a
constitutional amendment, and each will be discussed in turn.
A. Require Genuine Consultation Between the President and Both
Majority and Minority Members of the Senate
The United States Constitution provides that the Executive "shall
nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate...
Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United
States" ... "91 This clause delineates the power to nominate judges to the
Executive, while allowing the Senate to play a role in the process by
consenting to the nomination in order for the appointment to the bench to
be fulfilled.9 2 Over the years, this clause has not been read to require the
Executive to consult with members of the Senate before making judicial
nominations. 93  However, given the current political climate facing
91. U.S. CONST. art. 1I, § 2, cl. 2.
92. See id.
93. See Andrew W. McCarthy, The "Advice" in Advice and Consent, NATIONAL
REVIEW ONLINE, February 28, 2005, http://www.nationalreview.com/mccarthy/
mccarthy200502280746.asp (last visited January 31, 2007). McCarthy, a senior fellow at
the Foundation for the Defense of Democracy, argues that the Senate, according to the
language of the Appointments Clause has no part in the nomination process-that is the
prerogative of the President. Id. He states that the Senate's role comes into play only
after the President has made the nomination, when the Senate must act to confirm the
nominee in order to complete the appointment process. Id. McCarthy also points out the
language Hamilton used in Federalist 66: "There will, of course, be no exertion of choice
on the part of the Senate," in support of his argument. Id. However, the author does note
that it may be helpful, in the current political climate, to consider some of the suggestions
made by Senators that the President consult with them before making the nomination, but
such consultation would be done only at the discretion of the President. Id.
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judicial nominations, a broad constitutional amendment addressing the
nomination problem should include a clause requiring that there be some
meaningful consultation between the President and at the very least,
leaders of the majority and the minority in the Senate.
Consultation between the President and members of the majority
and minority in the Senate could go a long way toward alleviating some
of the tension that has been brewing over the nomination process.
Senators could suggest nominations that would be able to make it
through the Senate with broad support (and consequently no filibuster),
and the President could also indicate his strong preference for certain
nominees, if such a preference exists. While the nomination power is
explicitly granted to the President, the fact that Senate must sign off on
the nomination gives the President a strong incentive to consult with the
Senate before making nominations in order to ensure that his nominees
will win approval. That is not to say that there is no consultation right
now, but one of the biggest complaints of Democrats about President
George W. Bush's nominees is that there was a lack of consultation
between the President and the Senate Democratic Leadership before the
nomination was made.9 4 This is one of the factors that led to the
Democrats' filibustering of those nominees, and such a showdown could
be avoided, or at least made less likely, if there was a constitutional
consultation requirement added to the nomination process.
Presidents of both parties in the past have used Senate consultation
in order to smooth the road to confirmation of their judicial nominees.
Democratic Senator Joe Biden, who chaired the Judiciary Committee for
several years during the term of President Reagan, described a situation
where he would be approached by administration officials with the
names of who they were going to appoint. "I'd say, 'You're going to
have a problem with this one or that one'- maybe a dozen of the
hundreds of judges that Reagan appointed .... 'If you want to push that
guy, all the others will wait in line behind him.' And the problems were
generally removed." 95 Senator Biden compared this era to the current
climate and attitude of the Bush administration, by saying that the
administration "wants to shove everything down our throats. They don't
want to pull back on anybody.,
96
94. Senator Leahy, in a speech on the floor of the Senate in June 2005, during the
debate of the nomination of Janice Rogers Brown to the Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit, commented on the role Presidential consultation with the Senate should play in
the nomination process. "There was no meaningful consultation in connection with the
nomination of Janice Rogers Brown. Neither of her home-state Senators supports her.
There was no consultation with them, or with the Senate Democratic Leadership." 151
Cong. Rec. S6116, S6128 (June 7, 2005).
95. Toobin, supra note 27, at 45.
96. Id
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Republican Senator Orrin Hatch has taken credit for giving
President Clinton the names of Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Stephen
Breyer, after Clinton suggested the Senator give him some names of
potential Supreme Court nominees that might be approved by the
Senate.97 Senator Hatch, in his recent book, described how he was able
to steer President Clinton away from nominating a person who would
face a difficult nomination battle in the Senate, 98 instead giving the
names of two Justices who both easily won confirmation in the Senate.
99
These historical examples of consultation between members of both
parties to ensure a successful judicial nomination process shows that this
is a path that should be pursued regardless of which party is in control of
the White House, and which party is in control of the Senate. The "Gang
of 14," the group of moderates that saved (for the moment) the Senate
from the invocation of the nuclear option, recognized that consultation
was a way to avoid the partisan rancor and division that was caused by
the current status of the nomination process. The Senators, in their
Memorandum of Understanding, encouraged the President to consult
with members of both parties before making a nomination, indicating,
"Such a return to the early practices of our government may well serve to
reduce the rancor that unfortunately accompanies the advice and consent
process in the Senate."'
00
Consultation can be a way to move the judicial nomination process
along to a conclusion that is satisfactory to all parties involved.
Consultation will not remove all debate or disagreement from the system,
nor should it-debate and disagreement are at the very heart of a thriving
democracy-but it could ease some of the tension infused in the system
that is now in place, while simultaneously protecting the Senate from the
problems that would develop as a result of the nuclear option being
invoked.
97. See David S. Broder, Editorial, How to Head off a Fight Over the High Court,
WASH. POST, June 25, 2003, at A23.
98. Id.
99. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg was confirmed by a vote of 96-3 in 1993,
prompting the Washington Post to describe her nomination process as "one of the most
harmonious court confirmations in recent history." Joan Biskupic, Senate, 96-3,
Approves Ginsburg as 1 0 7 th Supreme Court Justice, WASH. POST, August 4, 1993, at A4.
Justice Stephen Breyer, President Clinton's second nominee to the nation's highest court,
won confirmation in the Senate by a vote of 87-9. Helen Dewar, Breyer Wins Senate
Confirmation to Top Court, 87 to 9, WASH. POST, July 30, 1994, at A9.
100. The full text of the two page memo is available at http://images.dailykos.com/
images/user/3/TheDeal.pdf (last visited Jan. 22, 2006).
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B. Set Standards for Disclosure of Documents from Nominees,
Encourage President to Waive Executive Privilege When
Reasonable
The Senate Judiciary Committee is tasked with being the gatekeeper
for judicial nominations, serving as the body that holds public hearings to
evaluate the nominee while simultaneously giving Americans their first
real look at a candidate for the federal bench. As part of the vetting
process undertaken by the Committee, Senators typically request
documents to be produced that give the Senators some insight into what
kind of judge the nominee will be if confirmed by the Senate. A
constitutional amendment addressing the nomination process should
promote compliance by interested parties with reasonable document
requests by Senators, and encourage the President to work with Senators
to fulfill document requests rather than invoke broad assertions of
executive privilege that may prevent the Senate from completing its
constitutionally mandated confirmation duty.
This tension between full disclosure of documents that arguably
relate to a particular judicial nomination and assertions of executive
privilege was evident in the successful nomination of Chief Justice John
Roberts 0' to the Supreme Court, and the failed nomination of Harriet
Miers 0 2 as an Associate Justice of the Court. The disclosure issue in the
Roberts nomination was related to documents that were prepared by the
nominee while he was working as a political appointee in the Solicitor
General's office from 1989 to 1993, under President George H.W.
Bush.10 3 As for Miers, who was appointed by President George W. Bush
while serving as White House Counsel, cited Senate requests of internal
documents related to her service in the White House as the reason for her
withdrawal.1
0 4
President Bush has steadfastly maintained that it is a priority for his
administration to protect executive privilege. When asked by a reporter
101. Roberts was confirmed as the 17"h Chief Justice of the United States by a vote of
78-22. Charles Babington & Pete Baker, Roberts Confirmed as 1 h Chief Justice, WASH.
POST, Sept. 30, 2005, at AOl.
102. On October 27, 2005, the President withdrew the nomination of Harriet Miers.
Michael A. Fletcher & Charles Babington, Miers, Under Fire From Right, Withdrawn as
Court Nominee, WASH. POST, Oct. 28, 2005, at AO1.
103. See Jo Becker, Work on Right Might Illuminate Roberts's Views, WASH. POST,
Sept. 8, 2005, at AO1.
104. MSNBC.com, Harriet Miers Withdrawal Letter, http://msnbc.msn.com/id/
9837716/from/RL.1/ (last visited Jan. 31, 2007). Miers wrote to the President,
"Protection of the prerogatives of the Executive Branch and continued pursuit of my
confirmation are in tension. I have decided that seeking my confirmation should yield."
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about the possibility of invoking executive privilege with respect to the
work Miers had done in the White House, the President responded, "[I]t
is important that we maintain executive privilege in the White House.
That's part of the deliberative process. That's how I'm able to get good,
sound opinions from people."'0' The President also acknowledged that
this was also a question that arose in the Roberts confirmation process,
and that the Administration handled the issue, concluding, "I just can't
tell you how important it is for us to guard executive privilege in order
for there to be crisp decision-making in the White House.,
10 6
The Supreme Court has recognized that Presidents have a
generalized right to protect the opinions expressed by those upon whom
they rely for advice, but this does not equate to an absolute right to
confidentiality in all circumstances. 10 7 The problem that arises in the
judicial nomination context is that the Senate has the role of Advice and
Consent, and in order to fulfill is constitutional responsibilities, it needs
access to enough information to complete its task. In the days leading up
to the scheduled confirmation hearings for Harriet Miers, both
Republicans and Democrats on the Judiciary Committee requested
documents that Miers prepared or reviewed during her tenure in the
White House Counsel's office.10 8 President Bush refused to yield to the
request, saying that it represented "a red line I'm not willing to cross. 109
A judicial nomination constitutional amendment should encourage
the President to work with the Senate and make efforts to accommodate
reasonable requests for information that may otherwise potentially be
covered by privilege. There is precedent from past nominations that
show that the Executive and the Senate can reach compromises that
allow both sides to feel as though they are protecting their constitutional
prerogatives, but still allow for the judicial confirmation to proceed
without impediment. During the Robert Bork nomination process,
documents were made available to Senators from his days of service in
the Solicitor General's office. 10 Senator Patrick Leahy cited this
example in an unsuccessful attempt to obtain documents from Chief
Justice Roberts's time in that same office that may have been relevant to
105. WhiteHouse.gov, President Holds Press Conference (Oct. 4, 2005),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/10/20051004-1 .html (last visited Jan. 31,
2007).
106. Id.
107. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
108. See Documents, Backlash Doomed Nomination, CNN.coM, Oct. 27, 2005,
http://www.cnn.com/2005/POLITICS/10/27/miers.reasons.
109. Id.
110. See John Dean, Precedent Works Against White House, CNN.coM, Aug. 3, 2005,
http://www.cnn.com/2005/Law/08/03/dean.roberts/.
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the Chiefs confirmation."' When former Chief Justice Rehnquist was
nominated to be Chief Justice in 1987, there was a bipartisan request
from members of the Judiciary Committee to have access to some of the
work that Rehnquist did while a member of the Attorney General's
Office of Legal Counsel, which was considered at the time to be "the
president's law office."' 12 President Reagan invoked executive privilege
with respect to those documents, and when it became clear that the
Judiciary Committee planned to stall the confirmation process without
access to the documents, a compromise was reached that allowed for
limited review of the records."
13
There is room for compromise between the two branches of
government that can be addressed by a constitutional amendment aimed
at developing a more effective judicial nomination process. The
President should resist overbroad attempts on the part of Senators to
access all records that may fall within the realm of privilege, but
likewise, the Senate should resist an attempt by the President to flatly
refuse to make any attempt to accommodate a reasonable request.
Senators and the President could agree to limit document requests to only
the essential information needed by the panel, or the President could
approve a limited "in camera" review of sensitive documents by a certain
group of Senators. The key is for both sides to make concessions and
work together, recognizing that each has an independent, constitutionally
mandated role in the judicial selection process. The best interests of the
American people are served by a collaborative process that ensures
nominees who will be receiving a lifetime appointment to the judiciary
truly are fit to hold that office.
C. Require All Nominations to be Reported from the Judiciary
Committee and Considered by the Full Senate
The Constitution requires the Senate's "Advice and Consent"" 4 on
all nominations before a candidate can be seated on the federal bench.
As previously noted, one of the obstructionist tactics that Senators have
used in order to derail judicial nominations is to allow candidates to
languish in the Judiciary Committee, where they were blocked from
111. See Leahy. Senate.gov, Letter from Senate Judiciary Democrats to Attorney
General Alberto Gonzales, http://leahy.senate.gov/press/200508/081205.html (last visited
Jan. 31, 2007). The Senate Democrats said, of the documents released regarding Judge
Bork, "Those documents were provided in a spirit of compromise pursuant to a limited
request from members of the Senate Judiciary Committee, much like the request we made
with respect to Judge Roberts." Id.
112. See Dean, supra note 110.
113. Id.
114. U.S. CONST. art. II, §2, cl. 2.
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receiving full consideration by the entire Senate, and never given
hearings or a committee vote. 1 5 A constitutional amendment should
address this problem and require that any nominations reported to the
Judiciary Committee for hearings must be reported out of that Committee
so as to be considered by the entire United State Senate.
The Senate Judiciary Committee's role in the nominating process
does serve an important purpose, allowing Senators the chance to ask
questions of the nominee, and allows the public some insight into the
type of person that could be serving as a judge.1 16 However, to allow a
small group of Senators on the Judiciary Committee... to block a
nominee from receiving full consideration of the Senate is not consistent
with the Framer's purpose of including the Senate in the nomination
process. The Constitution calls for the "Advice and Consent" of the
Senate, not a select cadre of Senators. Allowing nominations to be
blocked in committee essentially gives a handful of Senators the right to
reject a nominee without the "Advice and Consent" of the rest of the
body.
In Federalist No. 76, Alexander Hamilton addressed the
Appointment power. Hamilton explained that the purpose of the Senate
in the process was to be a check on the "spirit of favoritism in the
President" and was another check put in place to make sure that those
nominated to serve were fit to hold office. 1 8 Hamilton argued that a
President retaining "the sole disposition of offices would be governed
much more by his private inclinations and interests than when he was
bound to submit the. .. choice to the discussion and determination of a
different and independent body, and that body an entire branch of the
legislature."
1 9
In light of Hamilton's reference to the entire Senate as having the
responsibility to consent to nominations, it seems contrary to the original
intent of the Framers to allow nominations to fail in the Judiciary
Committee without ever being brought to the entire body for their
115. See supra text accompanying notes 31-34.
116. This notion, of course, is not universally recognized. The January 2006
Judiciary Committee Hearings on Samuel Alito's nomination as an Associate Justice of
the Supreme Court prompted one Democratic member of the Committee, Joe Biden, to
express his frustration with the hearings. "The system's kind of broken. Nominees now,
Democrat and Republican nominees, come before the Unites States Congress and resolve
not to let the people know what they think about the important issues," Biden remarked.
Biden: Supreme Court Confirmation Hearings should be Scrapped, CNN.coM, Jan. 12,
2006, http://www.cnn.com/2006/POLITICS/01/12/alito.biden.ap.
117. Currently, there are 19 Senators on the Judiciary Committee, 10 Democrats and
9 Republicans. See Senate.gov, United State Senate Committee on the Judiciary-
Members, http://judiciary.senate.gov/members.cfm (last visited Jan. 31, 2007).
118. THE FEDERALIST No. 76 (Alexander Hamilton).
119. Id. (emphasis added).
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consideration. Therefore, a constitutional amendment should require that
all nominations, whether referred to the Judiciary Committee or not,
should at least be placed before all of the Senators for consideration by
the entire branch of the legislature.
D. Address the Number of Votes Required to Confirm a Nominee and
Retain the Filibuster to Protect the Rights of the Minority
One of the strongest arguments against the use of the filibuster for
judicial nominations relies on the text of the Constitution itself. Critics
of the judicial filibuster argue that because the Framers did not put a
supermajority requirement in the text of the Appointments Clause, it
takes only a simple majority to confirm a nominee, and therefore a
filibuster which can only be stopped by 60 votes is a direct assault on the
text of the Constitution. 120 This leads many Republicans to the
conclusion that the judicial filibuster is unconstitutional. 2 '
Senator John Cornyn, a Texas Republican, noted in his opening
statement during a 2003 Senate Judiciary Committee Hearing on the
judicial filibuster that "Any exceptions to the doctrine of majority rule,
such as any rule of supermajority voting, must be stated expressly in the
Constitution."'' 22 " The Constitution does, in a number of instances,
expressly state a supermajority requirement for certain government
actions. For example, it takes two thirds of the Senate to ratify a
treaty,123 two thirds of both Houses to ratify an amendment to the
Constitution,' 24 and two thirds of the Senators present to convict in an
impeachment. 125 Senator Comyn, along with many of his colleagues on
the Republican side of the aisle believes that the filibuster is being
abused in the judicial nomination context. Their argument is that the use
of the procedural tactic in this instance is making an end round around
the constitution by allowing the minority to put a de facto supermajority
requirement on judicial confirmation votes, since it takes 60 votes to end
a filibuster.
26
120. See Toobin, note 27, at 44. See also Judicial Nominations, Filibusters, and the
Constitution: When a Majority is Denied its Right to Consent: Hearing Before the
Constitution, Civil Rights, and Property Rights Subcomm. Of the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 108th Cong. (2003) (statement of Sen. John Comyn, Member, S. Comm. on
the Judiciary) [hereinafter Comyn].
121. See Toobin, supra note 27, at 44. Senator Charles Grassley, a Republican from
Iowa noted, "Filibusters on nominations are an abuse of our function under the
Constitution to advise and consent." Id.
122. See Comyn, supra note 120.
123. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
124. U.S. CONST. art. V, cl. 1.
125. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
126. See Cornyn, supra note 120.
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However, Sarah Binder, a Senior Fellow for Governance Studies at
the Brookings Institution, observes that a study of the Constitution yields
a conclusion that filibusters of judicial nominees are constitutional.
"Republicans' constitutional reasoning ignores critical features of the
Constitution. The Framers of the Constitution provided clear
instructions... that each chamber would be empowered to write its own
rules. The Senate can set whatever rules it wishes for carrying out its
responsibilities of advice and consent."' 127 Binder argues that the Senate
Rule requiring 60 votes to end debate is therefore within the limits of the
Constitution. 128
Further, it is important to keep in mind that while a supermajority is
required to cut off debate, it is not required to confirm a judicial
nominee. This may seem like a fine distinction, but it is an important
one to make. The vote requirement to actually confirm a judicial
nominee is still a simple majority of Senators. Further, the Democrats in
the Senate have only acted to filibuster 10 judicial nominees, which is
hardly a large number compared to the more than 200 Bush judicial
nominees that have been confirmed by the Senate. 129 Changing the rules
of the Senate by invoking the "nuclear option" will cause more problems
than it will solve considering the small number of nominees that were
actually subjected to a filibuster.
All of the problems that have arisen in the course of the judicial
nomination process, including this most recent battle over the filibuster,
have led some scholars to suggest that a true supermajority requirement
be imposed in order to confirm judicial nominations.130 Judith Resnick, a
law professor at Yale University, argues that since the judges at issue
will be receiving lifetime appointments to the bench, Senator Frist's plan
to make it easier for a simple majority to confirm judicial nominees
should be abandoned in favor of a 60 vote requirement for confirmation
of all federal judges.
31
There are certainly benefits to adopting a supermajority rule for
confirmation of judicial nominees. It would protect the rights of the
minority, since it would require all nominees to have a large base of
127. Sarah Binder, Editorial, The Battle Isn't New: The Filibustering of Judicial
Nominations, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Mar. 6, 2005, at B06.
128. Id.
129. See Toobin, supra note 24, at 42.
130. See, e.g., John 0. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Supermajority Rules and
the Judicial Confirmation Process, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 543 (2005) (analyzing the
benefits and obstacles to a true supermajority rule for judicial nominations, and arguing
for a supermajority rule for committee proceedings in order to decrease the ability of
nominees to be blocked at the committee level); Judith Resnick, Editorial, Supermajority
Rule, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 2003, at A31.
131. See Resnick, supra note 130.
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support before being confirmed. John McGinnis, a Professor at
Northwestern Law School and Michael Rappaport, a Professor of Law at
the University of San Diego, argue that a supermajority rule would be
most beneficial when applied to judicial nominees at the Supreme Court
level. 132 "A supermajority rule would require that justices empowered to
entrench new principles through judicial amendments of the Constitution
must enjoy a substantial consensus of support before they take office."'
133
Perhaps the strongest benefit of a true supermajority rule is that it
would be a consensus forcing provision that will ultimately benefit a
party in the minority. However, there are limitations to the adoption of
such a rule, and some of those limitations are noted by Professors
McGinnis and Rappaport. The main concern they note in their article is
that such a rule could impede the Supreme Court nomination process.
"The delays could result in nominations being held up during elections,
thereby creating referenda on particular nominees and unduly politicizing
the selection process. '
134
Another problem that could occur as a result of a true supermajority
rule would be a dilution of the wide breadth of ideological diversity that
exists today in the federal judiciary. 35 Oftentimes great ideas or novel
solutions to a difficult problem are proposed by a judge who is
considered to be judicially conservative or liberal, and in those ideas the
seeds of future law can be found. Further, imposing a centrist forcing
supermajority rule could potentially lead to judges, who have a desire to
be appointed to a higher office, tempering their own judicial philosophies
solely to be a more attractive, centrist candidate ripe for an appointment,
and that could damage the integrity of the judicial system.
Ultimately, while any discussions of a long term solution to the
judicial nomination gridlock should consider the idea of a supermajority
requirement, it may be too difficult of a concession for the current
majority in the Senate to grant. A better approach, given the current
political climate, would be to maintain the majority confirmation rule as
it currently stands, and try to reach an agreement on the limited use of
filibusters by the party in the minority going forward. While the
filibuster is a politically sensitive topic, there could be a politically viable
compromise on the filibuster issue similar to the one reached by the
"Gang of 14" which averted the most serious attempt to invoke the
132. See McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 130, at 544-45.
133. Id. at 545.
134. Id.
135. Professors McGinnis and Rappaport recognize this limitation to some extent in
their article, as they do not advocate imposing a supermajority rule on lower court
nominees for this very reason. See McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 130, at 546.
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"nuclear option,136
IV. Conclusion
Neither party can claim "clean hands" when it comes to the
obstruction of judicial nominees. Republicans and Democrats alike have
engaged in delay tactics, partisan rhetoric, and obstructionism in order to
escalate the problems with the nomination process to the brink of Senator
Frist invoking the "nuclear option." This partisan escalation has added to
the increasing political divide in Washington, and has further damaged
the reputation of both parties in the eyes of the American people. The
consequences of a drastic change in Senate procedure that would
eliminate the filibuster would cause partisanship to skyrocket, and could
lead to a shutdown of the business of the Senate, which is not in the best
interests of either political party, the Senate as an institution, or the
country as a whole. The filibuster is one of the few tools that Senators in
the minority can use to protect their interests, and the interests of the
people that elected them to serve; it should be protected for the benefit of
future minority party members. What is needed now is a genuine effort
on both sides, recognizing that since both parties are part of the problem,
both need to be part of the solution. Working on a constitutional
amendment to address the problem can provide a forum for such an
effort.
There is no question that a constitutional amendment would be
difficult to accomplish, as the amendment process is a difficult hurdle to
clear.13  However, getting the interested parties in a room together to
begin discussing reform of the judicial nomination process, in whatever
capacity, would be a positive first step towards fixing a broken system.
A bipartisan group that would be commissioned to study the feasibility
of a constitutional amendment would provide the forum for a free
exchange of ideas, without the burden and pressure of discussing
problems with the nomination process in the politically charged context
that occurs when an actual nomination is being considered.
To that end, this Comment proposes the following language as the
starting point for the discussion of a Constitutional Amendment aimed at
136. For information on the agreement reached by the "Gang of 14," see supra notes
47-55 and accompanying text.
137. The Constitution proposes two different methods for amendments. The first
option is to have an amendment approved by a two thirds majority of both Houses of
Congress and then ratified by either three fourths of the State Legislatures or State
Constitutional Conventions. U.S. CONST. art. V. The second method is for two thirds of
the States to call for a Constitutional Convention to consider an amendment. Under this
method, any proposed amendment would still need to be ratified by three fourths of the
States. Id.
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reforming the judicial nomination process:
Before making a judicial nomination pursuant to Article I § 2, the
Executive shall consult with members of the majority and the
minority in the United States Senate for advice on potential
nominees. The nominee and the Executive Branch shall comply with
all reasonable requests for information by the Senate with regards to
the nomination. A claim of Executive Privilege should only be made
when absolutely necessary, and the Executive shall make reasonable
efforts to compromise with the Senate on document requests before
invoking the privilege. All nominations, whether referred to a Senate
Committee or not, shall be reported to the full Senate for
consideration, in order to give all Senators an opportunity for debate,
if they so desire. A judicial nominee shall be confirmed if a majority
of the Senators concur. In order to end debate on a judicial nominee,
three-fifths of the Senators must concur. Nominees shall only be
filibustered under extraordinary circumstances, and each Senator
must use their own discretion in determining whether such
circumstances exist.
This language is merely a suggestion for the starting point of a
discussion. The first sentence concerns the need for consultation
between the Executive and the Senate before a nomination is made. At
this stage of the process it is possible that some of the problems with
certain nominations could be resolved, avoiding a lengthy and politically
damaging floor fight. Consultation will give the Senators input into the
process before they are required to give their advice and consent, and the
Executive will have a chance to get a feel for which nominees may face
some problems during the confirmation process and which will be
approved without delay. The second and third sentences encourage
compromise between the Senate and the Executive in order to help strike
the proper balance between the President's need to protect the
prerogatives of the Office and the Senate's need for full and accurate
information regarding a nominee in order to fulfill their constitutional
duty. The fourth sentence ensures that the full Senate, and not a small
group of Senators on the Judiciary Committee, will have the opportunity
to lend their input on a certain nomination, ending the practice of
blocking nominations at the committee level. The final three sentences
preserve the majority rule for Senate judicial confirmations, and also
protect the ability of the minority to use the filibuster in extraordinary
circumstances. The last sentence was taken directly from the
compromise agreement already reached by members of both parties
comprising the "Gang of 14." This language proves that an agreement is
possible on the use of the filibuster. The agreement should therefore be a
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common starting point for both parties in the discussions regarding the
future of the judicial filibuster.
Fictional Senator Jefferson Smith used the filibuster to save his
reputation, while reminding us that decency and integrity are things
worth fighting for. Perhaps we can use this constitutional amendment to
save the filibuster, and along the way resurrect the spirit of compromise
for the greater good that helped make this nation great.
